The Widening Gyre: A Survey of Post-\u3cem\u3eKelley\u3c/em\u3e Lender Environmental Liability Issues Under CERCLA, Chapters 376 and 403, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 24, Dade County Code by Goldstein, Michael R.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Business Law Review
4-1-1995
The Widening Gyre: A Survey of Post-Kelley
Lender Environmental Liability Issues Under
CERCLA, Chapters 376 and 403, Florida Statutes,
and Chapter 24, Dade County Code
Michael R. Goldstein
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Business
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael R. Goldstein, The Widening Gyre: A Survey of Post-Kelley Lender Environmental Liability Issues Under CERCLA, Chapters
376 and 403, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 24, Dade County Code, 5 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 41 (1995)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr/vol5/iss1/4
THE WIDENING GYRE: A SURVEY OF POST-KELLEY LENDER
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY ISSUES UNDER CERCLA,
CHAPTERS 376 AND 403, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND CHAPTER
24, DADE COUNTY CODE
Michael R. Goldstein'
The Second Coming!
Hardly are those words out
When a vast image out of Spiritus Mundi
Troubles my sight
In February of 1994, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit vacated the United States Environmental Protection Agency's
("EPA") Final Rule on Lender Liability ("Final Rule").2 In so doing, the court
abandoned a comprehensive safe harbor afforded lenders3 which had allowed
them to hold environmentally distressed collateral while at the same time
reducing their risk of exposure to the harsh joint and several liability scheme
provided for under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA").' Absent this protection,
lenders, at least those situated within the Eleventh Circuit, are once again
subject to the notorious and over-reaching decision of United States v. Fleet
* Mr. Goldstein is an attorney with the environmental practice group of Coil, Davidson, Carter,
Smith, Salter & Barkett, P.A. His practice consists of matters related to lender environmental liability,
structuring real property transactions involving environmental distress, environmental cost recovery litigation,
underground storage tank regulation, environmental permitting, and water quality and use.
I William Butler Yeats, The Second Coming, The Collected Poems of W.B. Yeats, A New Edition
(1989).
2 Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 25 F.3d 1088 (memorandum
opinion). For additional commentary and analysis regarding vacation of the Final Rule, see Debra L. Baker,
The EPA Lender Liability Rule - Here Today, Gone Tomorrow, 8 Prob. & Prop. 12 (May-June 1994); Alex
C. Geisinger, From the Ashes of Kelley v. EPA: Framing the Next Step of the CERCLA Lender Liability
Debate, 4 DuKE EvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 41 (1994); Marianne Lavelle and Harvey Berkman, Lender Liability
Limits Struck in Superfund, NAT'L L J., Feb. 21, 1994, at 5; Edward B. Sears and Laurie P. Sears, Comment,
Lender Liability Under CERCLA: Uncertain Times for Lenders, 24 ENvrL. L. REP. 10320 (June 1994);
Sandra Dauta, Suggestions for Minimizing Lender Liability after "Kelley", Los ANGELES DAILY J., April 25,
1994, at 7; Cliff Tuttle, Regulations Designed to Protect Lenders from Clean-up Costs Struck Down, 17
PENN. L. WEEK., May 9, 1994, at 28.
The term 'lenders" in this article refers not only to financial institutions, but any secured creditor
be it a business entity or individual that holds indicia of title primarily to protect a security interest.
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq.
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Factors.5 While state law poses additional liability, lenders doing business in
Dade County have even more reason to be concerned: lender environmental
liability under Chapter 24 of the Dade County Code is arguably far more over-
reaching than anything ever provided for by Florida or Congress.
I. INTRODUCTION
The past three decades have seen a dizzying increase in legislative,
regulatory and judicial activity in the environmental arena. There has been an
explosion of complex statutory schemes6 under which individuals and entities
may find themselves liable.' In the world of environmental law, the rules are
always changing, always evolving and, significantly, notions and theories of
liability are constantly expanding.8 These responsibilities, both civil and
criminal,9 are not only found on the federal and state level, but in detailed local
901 F.2d 1550 (11 th Cit. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 752 (1990).
See Randolph L Hill, An Overview of RCRA: The "Mind-Numbing" Provisions for the Most
Complicated Environmental Statute, 21 ENvTL. L. REp. 10254 (May 1991).
7 In addition to CERCLA, a host of federal environmental statutes pose risk to owners and operators,
and thus, potentially, to lenders. These include the Solid Waste Disposal Act, as amended by the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA") and the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of
1984, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq.; the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended by the Clean Water
Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq.; the Clean Air Act of 1966, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq.;
the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 ("TSCA'), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq.; the Hazardous Materials
Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. App. 1801 et seq.; the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, as
amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq.; the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq.; the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001 et seq.; and the Safe Drinking
Water Act of 1974, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300(f) et seq.; see also Stephen L Kass and Michael B.
Gerrard, Lender Liability for Water Pollution, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 20, 1991, at 3.
In addition to statutory liability, a universe of common law and toxic tort theories of liability may
apply including negligence, nuisance, trespass, and strict liability for ultrahazardous activity. See, e.g., O'Neil
v. Q.LCKI., Inc., 750 F. Supp. 551 (D.R.I. 1990) (holding lender potentially liable for water pollution under
common law aiding and abetting theory); Birth of a New Lender Liability Theory? Aiding and Abetting a
Borrower's Violation of Environmental Laws, 6 TXLR 950 (January 8, 1992); Michael J. Maher, Common
Law Liability for Leaking Underground Storage Tanks, 13 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 519 (1993); David Grais,
Lender Liability for Injuries from Lead Paint, N.Y. L.J., April 22, 1993, at 1.
a See Robert E. Lannan, The Ever-Expanding Scope of Liability Under CERCLA 107(a)(3): An End
in Sight?, 20 N. KY. L. REV. 75 (1992); EPA Criminal Enforcement Comes of Age, Officials Say; Cases to
Double, [DEN] Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 48, Mar. 14, 1994, at AA-1; U.S. Firms Predicted to Feel
Effects of Environmental Management Standards, [DEN] Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 50, Mar. 16, 1994,
at A-I; More Systematic, Targeted Efforts Promised; EPA Emphasis on Compliance Assurance Praised, 25
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 14 (May 6, 1994).
9 See Robert Damell, Environmental Criminal Enforcement and Corporate EvironmentalAuditing,
Time for a Compromise? 31 AM. CtM. L REv. 123 (1993); Edward F. Novak and Charles W. Steese, Survey
of Federal and State Environmental Crime Legislation, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 571 (1992).
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ordinances as well. Generally speaking, it follows that lenders have good reason
to fear the liability that may arise under federal law the most. Banking
executives, loan officers and general counsel follow the cases and regulations
that arise under CERCLA and, as best as is possible, plan accordingly. An
encyclopedia of literature devoted to analysis and diligence has developed on
this issue alone.'0 However, given the very recent administrative and judicial
events as well as legislative action that may or may not occur in the near future,
the issue of lender environmental liability and the problems and partial
solutions associated with it are all again ripe for review.
Following the Kelley decision," lenders are arguably subject to the
capricious Fleet Factors2 regime which established, first in dicta but now
accepted and feared as the law of the case, that secured creditors could be held
liable as owners or operators where their involvement in the financial
management of a borrower's property indicated a mere capacity to influence
decisions related to hazardous waste management and disposal. 3 Furthermore,
actual involvement in the borrower's day-to-day operations would not be
necessary to incur liability; the Fleet Factors court held that a secured creditor
would be liable if its involvement with the management of the facility was
sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could affect hazardous waste
disposal decisions if it so chose. 4
This Article, then, is a comprehensive treatment of federal, state and local
issues related to environmental liability. Part II briefly discusses the nature of
environmental risks to lenders and attempts to identify both direct and indirect
costs that may be incurred. Part III addresses lender environmental liability
under federal law. It briefly analyzes the CERCLA statutory scheme, the
secured creditor exemption, case law interpreting the exemption, the Final Rule
and case law following its promulgation. Part IV discusses lender liability under
Florida law and, in the main, focuses on the exclusion for petroleum
contamination. Part V addresses the seldom discussed or analyzed lender
liability provisions of Chapter 24 of the Dade County Code, under which no
exemptions apply. Part VI of the Article sets forth lender strategies to define,
manage and document the types of environmental risks arising under the
10 A review of the July 1994 Infotrac Database revealed that the category "Hazardous Substances"
contained over 1000 law review and journal articles. See also Cumulative Bibliography, 23 ENVTL. L. REP.
(Indexes) 4005 (Jan. 1993).
1 Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C.Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 25 F.3d 1088 (memorandum opinion).
12 Supra note 6.
13 901 F.2d at 1557.
14 Id. at 1557-58.
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aforementioned liability schemes. This section includes review of the FDIC
Guidelines for Environmental Risk Management issued in February of 1993."
Finally, the potential for meaningful reform will be addressed. Part VII analyzes
federal legislation proposed in both the House of Representatives and the
Senate which purp9rts to limit the liability of secured creditors. In addition, a
proposed lender liability rule for underground storage tanks is analyzed.
H. NATURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK TO SECURED
CREDITORS
As a preliminary matter, and so that lenders may intuit how far reaching the
liability for environmental occurrences suffered by their borrowers may be, it
is essential to have a full understanding of the varied forms in which
environmental risk may present itself. There are a host of direct and indirect
risks presented not only by the various federal, state and local liability schemes
but also by an ever-expanding array of environmental regulation and the
exacting enforcement culture which all work in concert to threaten a borrower's
solvency, the proffered collateral and, of course, the lender's assets above and
beyond the value of the collateral.
A. Direct Liability for Clean-up Costs as Owner
The first element of environmental risk that a lender should be concerned
with, the direct cost of remediation, is necessarily the most obvious as it is
potentially the most ruinous. When calculating the risk of incurring liability for
its borrower's environmental incidents, a lender, due to the joint and several
liability among potentially responsible parties, 6 is well advised to plan on
assuming at the very least its borrower's full share. The worst case scenario, of
course, is that in addition to an insolvent borrower, there are no other
potentially responsible parties in a financial position to share the burden of
remediation. In that case, a deep pocket lender, absent an ability to prove
Is Published in Environmental Due Diligence Guide (BNA), at 501:1201.
16 See Section M.A., infra.
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divisibility of harm,7 will most probably incur liability for an incident in its
entirety.
The direct cost of remediation at a given Superfund site is enormous and
will most always outpace even the collateral tendered in any significant
commercial transaction. The average cost of investigation and remediation at
non-federal sites included on the National Priorities List, a federal list compiled
by the EPA which identifies the sites necessitating immediate attention and
eligible for federal funds, is $26.5 million.' A recent Congressional Budget
Office report estimates that the clean-up of non-federal hazardous waste sites
could reach $120 billion in current dollars.' Costs where state or local
governments take a lead role, while considerably less, are still significant.
B. Collateral Devaluation and/or Restriction
In addition to the above, there are serious indirect costs associated with
environmental contamination arising not only under CERCLA, but other
environmental statutes as well. First, the stigmatization of land or its perceived
loss in value due to its "toxic taint" can and frequently does result in an outright
loss in value.' It is entirely possible to hold hundreds of acres of land or
thousands of square feet of commercial space that has no value as collateral,
that no buyer would touch. The enforcement mechanism undergirding a loan
in the first place is thereby emasculated, and the lender is essentially then
rendered a lender at sufferance. The value of the collateral may also be
' A potentially responsible party may successfully defend against the full application of joint and
several liability if it presents evidence demonstrating that the quantum of hazardous substances contributed
to a release is divisible and capable of being apportioned. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Marisol Inc., 725 F. Supp. 833 (M.D. Pa. 1989); see also David M. Moore, The
Divisibility of Harm Defense to Joint and Several Liability Under CERCLA, 23 ENvrL. L REP. 10529 (Sept.
1993); B. Todd Wetzel, Divisibility of Harm under CERCLA: Does an Indivisible Potential or Averted Harm
Warrant the Imposition of Joint and Several Liability?, 81 KY. LJ. 825 (1992-93).
is Lloyd S. Dixon, Fixing Superfund: The Effect of the Proposed Superfund Reform Act of 1994 on
Transaction Costs, RAND MR-455-ICJ, at 66 (1994).
19 Non-Federal Cleanups Could Cost $120 Billion for Work through 2075, CEO Says in New
Report, 24 ENv'T REP. (BNA) No. 43, at 1854 (February 25, 1994).
2 See James P. Downey, Environmental Cleanup Actions, The Valuation of Contamination Property
and Just Compensation for Affected Property Owners, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 325 (1993); Nancy A.
Mangone, The Effect of Superfund Site Designation on Property Values -Smuggler Mountain, Aspen,
Colorado: A Case Study, 70 DEN. U. L REV. 537 (1993).
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diminished or even extinguished outright due to restrictions imposed on future
land uses.2'
C. Impairment of Borrower's Ability to Service Debt Obligation
It goes without saying that any obligation or occurrence affecting a
borrower's solvency will constitute a direct threat to the integrity of the loan
itself. The direct cost of remediation, as discussed above, is certainly this sort
of direct threat to the borrower's ability to service its debt. Yet environmental
regulation and the strict regulatory culture through which rules are implemented
and enforced impose yet another threat, albeit an indirect one. Simply stated,
the failure to comply with any applicable regulation may invite the close
scrutiny of environmental regulators. These agencies frequently have the
power,22 and sometimes the predisposition, to shut down a borrower
completely, thus once again calling into doubt a borrower's ability to service
its debt.
A failure to comply also invites the imposition of penalties which tend to
be severe.' Under RCRA, for example, the federal government can levy fines
of up to $25,000 per day.2' In 1993, the EPA collected a record $133 million
in civil and criminal fines. 25 The median civil penalty collected under RCRA
in 1993 was $600,000.26 While under no circumstance is the lender in danger
of assuming a borrower's penalty obligation by mere foreclosure, at least not
21 See, e.g., United States v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 25 F.3d 66, 69 (2nd Cir. 1994); Harriett Jane Olsen
and Pamela A. Humbert, Deed Restrictions May Trouble Regulated Community, N.J. LJ., Mar. 14, 1994,
at S15.
22 See, e.g., RCRA §§ 3008, 3013; 40 C.F.R. § 270.41; Adam Babich, RCRA Imminent Hazard
Authority: A Powerful Tool for Business, Government and Citizen Enforcers, 21 ENVIL. L REP. 10122 (Mar.
1994).
23 See William D. Wick, Cleanup Violators Face Huge Penalties, Including Punitiv es, LOS ANGELES
DAILY J., May 13, 1994, at 7.
24 RCRA § 3008(g) (civil fines). Criminal penalties under RCRA can be as high as $50,000 per day
per violation. RCRA § 3008(d). See, e.g., United States v. EKCO Housewares, Inc., 853 F. Supp. 975 (N.D.
Ohio 1994) (court determined that based on 4606 violation days, civil penalty of $115 million could be
imposed but actually imposed lesser fine, calculated at $1000 per day, of $4.6 million).
25 Of this amount, $103.8 million was for civil infractions and $29.5 million was criminal violations.
A record number of 2110 cases were also brought by the EPA in 1993, broken down as follows: 140 criminal
cases, 1614 administrative penalty actions, 338 civil judicial cases and 18 actions to enforce existing consent
decrees. Criminal Cases, Fine Collections Rise in 1993, EPA Says in Report on Enforcement, 24 ENV'T REP.
(BNA) No. 33, at 1516 (Dec. 17, 1993).
26 Recent record penalties include fines against Bethlehem Steel Corp. of $6 million for RCRA and
RCRA-related Safe Drinking Water Act Violations, and against United Technologies for what was then the
highest RCRA levy ever imposed, $3.7 million. Id.
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under state and federal law,27 a major penalty can wipe out a borrower's ability
to function in a business capacity.
D. Environmental Liens
One last significant element facing lenders in the environmental risk
equation is the environmental lien mechanism. While CERCLA does provide
for the imposition of liens against all real and personal assets affected,' it is the
environmental "superlien" which is even more distressing. Briefly stated,
superliens, creatures of state law, operate to take priority over pre-existing
recorded liens.29 Currently, Florida does not statutorily provide for
environmental superliens.
H. LENDER LIABILITY UNDER FEDERAL LAW
It is undeniably the case that there are many sources of environmental law
which pose risk to a secured lender. Notwithstanding this fact, in extending
credit and securing loan obligations, lenders must carefully focus on CERCLA,
the centerpiece of the federal environmental arsenal. The broad mandate given
by Congress to execute clean up of contaminated facilities, the consistently
generous judicial interpretation of who may be liable, a strict and unforgiving
liability scheme, and a chimerical exemption for secured creditors all conspire
to make the avoidance of liability, literally, a moving target.
A. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act: Liability Scheme; Defenses
CERCLA is, charitably put, by no means a model of legislative clarity. ° As
a compromise statute hastily enacted,3' it is rife with ambiguity and
27 But see Section V, infra, for discussion of a lender's administrative-type liability under Chapter
24, Dade County Code.
29 CERCLA § 107(1).
29 See e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 322452A; Mass Gen.. Laws Ann. § 21E; N.J. Rev. Stat. §§
58-10:23.11-10-45.
30 "Mhe legislative history of CERCLA gives more insight into the Alice-in-Wondedand-like nature
of the evolution of this particular statute than it does helpful hints on the intent of the legislature." HRW
Systems, Inc. v. Washington Gas Light Co., 823 F. Supp. 318, 327 (D. Md. 1993).
31 United States v. A & N Cleaners and Launderers, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 229, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1994);
United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 9032 (D. N.H. 1985); United States v. Waste Industries, Inc., 556
F. Supp. 1311 (E.D. N.C. 1982).
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inconsistency.32 However, one of the few aspects not enshrouded in uncertainty
is the intent of Congress in enacting CERCLA. The legislative history makes
clear that CERCLA is a remedial statute intended to facilitate the clean up of
contaminated properties at private expense.3 And courts have seized upon both
the ambiguity and the mandate and construed the statute to extend liability to
many parties not specifically identified. These twin engines driving the
expansion of liability go a long way towards explaining CERCLA's onerous
effect on lenders.
CERCLA identifies four categories of persons as potentially responsible
parties ("PRP"): (i) current owners or operators of property; (ii) past owners if
they owned or operated the property at the time of a release of hazardous
substances; (iii) generators and possessors of hazardous substances who
arranged for disposal, treatment or transport; and (iv) transporters of hazardous
substances who selected a treatment facility from which a release subsequently
occurred. 4 CERCLA has a roundly condemned but deserved reputation for its
harsh and onerous operation and results. Liability is strict,35 retroactive, 3' and
joint and several 37 for costs incurred by federal and state agencies as well as
private parties in responding to and remediating a release or threatened release.
Specifically, a PRP is liable for all costs of removal or remediation incurred by
the United States or a given state; any other necessary costs of response
incurred by any other person; damages for destruction of natural resources; and
costs of any health assessment or health effect study.3 The statute provides only
limited and very narrow defenses for releases related to acts of war; acts of
God; and acts of third parties other than those caused by employees or agents
32 See Smith Land & Improvement Corporation v. Celotex, 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1988).
33 In enacting CERCLACongress expressed its major policy goals quite clearly. Thus the statute's
objectives are the following: to encourage maximum care and responsibility in the handling of hazardous
waste;... and to ensure the parties responsible for the release of hazardous substances bear the costs of
response and cost of damage to natural resources.Chemical Waste Management, Inc., v. Armstrong World
Industries, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 n. 6 (E.D. Pa. 1987); see also U.S. v. A & N Cleaners and
Launderers, Inc., 854 F.Supp. 229,239 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy,
Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986).
34 CERCLA § 107(a).
35 United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 160, 167 n.11 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 3156
(1989); Jordan v. Southern WoodPiedmont Co., 805 F. Supp. 1575, 1578 (S.D. Ga. 1992); U.S. v. Cannons
Engineering Corp., 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990).
36 Kelly Y. Tiscornia, 827 F. Supp. 1315 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
37 United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805-10 (S.D. Ohio 1983); United States
v. Miami Drum Services, Inc., 25 ERC 1469, 1474-75 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
38 CERCLA § 107(A)-(D).
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of the defendant, or those occurring in connection with a contractual
relationship existing directly or indirectly with the defendant.39
B. SECURED CREDITOR EXEMPTION
One other basic defense exists, and it is the focal point of this Article.' In
actuality, the defense is couched in the terms of an exemption and, like the
innocent landowner defense, it can be found in the definitional section of
CERCLA. The secured creditor defense is an expansion on the "own-
er\operator" terminology and provides that "the term owner or operator shall
not include a person, who, without participating in the management of a
facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect a security interest."'
1. Judicial Interpretation
In interpreting this exemption courts have been theoretically, doctrinally
and analytically all over the place.42 The lack of consistency is especially
frustrating to anyone connected with the lending industry because, as discussed,
the stakes are so high. In short, the fuss is that there is no consistent guidance
regarding what a lender may or may not do to protect its interest in property
collateralizing a loan without incurring the significant joint and several liability
commonly associated with environmental occurrences. A logical dilemma
follows: a lender must involve itself in certain aspects of a borrower's activities
at various stages during the life of a loan. In order to maintain meaningful
security, a lender will retain somewhat intrusive power to influence a borrower
and its operations. A lender, to save or even to work out a loan, will not
39 CERCLA § 107(b). An additional defense is found in the definitional section of CERCLA and is
known colloquially as the innocent landowner defense. See CERCLA § 101(35)(A), (B); L. Jager Smith, Jr.,
CERCLA's Innocent Landowner Defense: Oasis or Mirage, 18 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 155 (1993); G. Van
Velsor Wolf, Jr., Emerging Contours of the CERCLA Innocent Purchaser Defense, 20 ENVTL. L. REP. 10483
(1990).
40 While this Article focuses on the secured creditor exemption and protecting against owner and
operator liability under CERCLA sections 107(a)(1) and (2), it is worth noting that nothing in the exemption
protects a lender from incurring liability as an arranger for disposal or transporter of hazardous substances
under CERCLA sections 107(a)(3) and (4). Thus, for example, where the lender possesses the right to conduct
a clean-up, one poorly planned and executed can still result in liability. See, e.g., U.S. v. Fleet Factors Corp.,
821 F. Supp. 707 (S.D. Ga. 1993).
41 CERCLA § 101(20)(A).
42 Carroll E. Dubue and William D. Evans, Jr., Recent Developments in Lender Liability Under
CERCLA: Coping with "Animal House" Disorder, 28 ToRT & INS. L.J. 40 (1992).
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infrequently have to roll up its sleeves and dirty its hands in the business of a
borrower. Unfortunately, to one federal appellate circuit, this normal course of
affairs looked too much like "participation in the management of a facility" and
it established a pinprick threshold of liability on this score.43
A second interpretive problem upon which the courts have stumbled relates
to the definition of "maintaining indicia of ownership primarily to protect a
security interest." Again, in the real world, foreclosure will become, at times,
necessary, and lenders will acquire, at least in the short term, full title to
collateral. Other times, under certain common arrangements, lenders will
acquire full title involuntary; that is, their indicia of ownership may mature into
outright title without any positive steps taken by the lender. Certain courts have
taken a crabbed approach to this phenomena, the temporary vesting of title in
the lender, and held that upon such an occurrence, the exemption fails."
In the "cannon" of lender environmental liability law, four principal
decisions stand out and underscore the conflicting messages sent by the courts
interpreting the secured creditor exemption.
a. United States v. Mirabile45
This earliest of cases presents a reasonable but unfortunately fleeting
interpretation of the secured creditor exemption. In this case, a lender
foreclosed on contaminated property and took actual title to it, but conveyed it
less than four months later. During the time that the bank held title, it secured
a building against vandalism by boarding up windows and changing locks,
made inquiries about the cost of disposal of drums located on the property and
showed it to prospective purchasers. The first issue before the court was
whether the lender's actions constituted impermissible participation in
management. The court carefully scrutinized the types of borrower actions the
lender became involved in and drew a bright line distinction between financial
aspects and operational aspects. The court approved of the lender's
involvement in the financial management of its borrower, holding that only
involvement in the day-to-day operational affairs of a borrower will predicate
a finding of impermissible participation in management. The second issue the
court addressed was foreclosure and whether by this action alone the lender
could no longer avail itself of the secured creditor exemption. Again, sensibly,
43 Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557.
44 See Section I.E.(ll). infra.
45 15 Ehvtl. L. Rep. 20992 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
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the court found for the lender, holding that its actions with respect to
foreclosure were plainly undertaken to protect its security interest.
b. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust46
The Maryland Bank & Trust decision is diametrically opposed to the
Mirabile case and is a direct precursor to Fleet Factors.47 This case involved
an attempt by the United States to recover half a million dollars in response
costs incurred to clean up the defendant bank's borrower's property, a 117-acre
farm. The central issue was whether the bank's foreclosure vitiated the secured
creditor exemption. The court construed the rule very narrowly, finding the
exemption to be a fragile defense at best. The court wrote that "the security
interest must exist at the time of the clean up. The mortgage held by Maryland
Bank terminated at the foreclosure sale at which time it ripened into full title."46
In a stinging rebuttal to secured lenders in general, the court rejected the
defendant bank's arguments concluding that
[u]nder the scenario put forward by the bank, the federal government
alone would shoulder the cost of cleaning up the site, while the former
mortgagee turned owner, would benefit from the clean up by the
increased value of the now unpolluted land. At the foreclosure sale, the
mortgagee could acquire the property cheaply. All other prospective
purchasers would be faced with potential CERCLA liability, and
would shy away from the sale.
In essence, the defendant's position would convert CERCLA into
an insurance scheme for financial institutions, protecting them against
possible losses due to the security of loans with polluted properties.
Mortgagees, however, already have the means to protect themselves,
by making prudent loans. Financial institutions are in a position to
investigate and discover potential problems in their secured properties.
For many lending institutions, such research is routine. CERCLA will
not absolve them from responsibility for their mistakes of judgment.49
46 632 F. Supp 573 (D. Md. 1986).
47 See Section Ifl.B.l.c., infra.
49 632 F. Supp. at 579.
49 Id. at 580.
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c. United States v. Fleet Factors'°
While Maryland Bank was cause for a certain amount of concern in the
industry, Fleet Factors, the dark knight of the lender liability "cannon," roused
it to action. Here, a factoring company extended credit to a manufacturer and
secured the loans with accounts receivable, equipment, inventory and property.
After the manufacturer defaulted, the lender foreclosed on some of the
equipment and inventory and contracted to have the site cleaned up. Critically,
it never foreclosed on the property. Nevertheless, the court took the opportunity
to expound upon the standards related to the secured creditor exemption. In so
doing, it rejected outright the lender friendly, bright line rule enunciated in
Mirabile, stating the following:
Under the standard we adopt today, a secured creditor may incur
liability ... by participating in the financial management of a facility
to a degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's
treatment of hazardous wastes. It is not necessary for the secured
creditor actually to involve itself in the day to day operations of the
facility in order to be liable .... Nor is it necessary for the secured
creditor to participate in the management decisions related to
hazardous waste. Rather, a secured creditor will be liable if its
involvement with the management of the facility is sufficiently broad
to support the inference that it could affect hazardous waste disposal
decisions if it so chose.5
With this, the Eleventh Circuit established a pinprick theory of
liability for lenders, a standard totally oblivious to the realties of the
dynamics between lender and borrower.5 2
so 901 F.2d 1550 (1lth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 752 (1990).
s1 901 F.2d at 1557-58.
s2 For futher analysis regarding the impact of Fleet Factors, see G. Alan Perkins, Lender Liability
Under CERCLA Deserves More Than A Fleeting Glance, 13 U. ARK. LrnrLE ROCK L.. 209 (1991); Nill V.
Toulme and Douglas E. Cloud, The Fleet Factors Case: A Wrong Turn for Lender Liability Under Superfund,
26 WAKE FORESr L REv. 127 (1991); Weintraub and Resnick, Secured Creditor's Liability for Hazardous
Cleanup Costs: The Warnings of Fleet Factors, 23 U.C.C. LJ. 420 (1991); Timothy R. Zinnerver, Lender
Liability under CERCLA and the Fleeting Protection of the Secured Creditor Exemption, 44 Sw. IJ. 1449
(1991).
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d. In Re Bergsoe Metal Corp.3
In a decision reached shortly after Fleet Factors, and yet of little value to
lenders within the Eleventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit attempted to provide a
zone of comfort to lenders. In Bergsoe Metal, due to a complicated and
interlocking series of transactions involving municipal revenue bonds, a sale
lease back agreement and a warranty deed, a municipal corporation was sued
by a private party for costs incurred to clean up contamination. On summary
judgment, the Ninth Circuit addressed the principal lender liability issues: what
constitutes impermissible participation in management and when a party holds
indicia of ownership primarily to protect a security interest.
The municipal corporation, a port authority, held title to the contaminated
property by warranty deed that it acquired in a sale and lease back transaction.
As a defendant in a separate action for declaratory judgment that Bergsoe be
liable for all cleanup costs, Bergsoe in turn filed a third party suit for
contribution against, inter alia, the port authority arguing that the port authority
was also an owner under CERCLA. The court acknowledged that the port
authority did indeed hold paper title to the subject property, but that was not
enough. The critical inquiry for the court was the reason for the port's holding
title.' The court determined in short order that the port did so simply to ensure
that Bergsoe would meet its lease and other obligations.
The more meaningful impact of the Bergsoe decision, however, is found
in its discussion of "participation in management." While sidestepping a direct
address of the rigorous standard established by Fleet Factors,5 it did roll back
at least one onerous and unworkable aspect: "It is clear from the statute that,
whatever the precise parameters of 'participation,' there must be some actual
management of the facility before a secured creditor will fall outside the
exception.""6 Despite this favorable result, as a Ninth Circuit case, lenders in
the Eleventh Circuit are cautioned not to rely upon it.
53 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
54 910 F.2d at 671.
55 "We leave for another day the establishment of a Ninth Circuit rule on this difficult issue." Id. at
672.
5 Id. The court examined the actions of the port authority and found no actual management of the
facilty. It approved a lender's involvement at the planning stages of any large-scale project and its reservation
of rights to inspect the premises and to re-enter and take possession upon foreclosure.
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e. Annotated Lender Liability "Cannon"
There are a handful of other cases on lender liability, at both the district
court and appellate level, which, while under particular circumstances may
provide guidance, taken as a whole, reveal how clouded and unsettled this area
of law really is. (Where the facts of the following cases provide specific
guidance other than citation in favor of a particular proposition, brief
annotations are given.)
(i) Cases Holding Lender Within Exemption Because of Failure to
Participate in Management
(a) In Re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc. 7
(b) Guidance v. BFG Electroplating & Manufacturing Co.58 In this case,
a borrower defaulted and the lender, a bank, took the following steps: it met
with company officials of the borrower, visited the property and held meetings
to restructure the loans. But cf. Section (iii) below.
(c) Grantors to the Silresim Site Trust v. State Street Bank & Trust Co.59 In
this case, the lender, a bank, took the following steps: it influenced removal of
the borrower's chief executive officer, directly attempted to collect accounts
receivable owed to the borrower and made demands regarding the collateral and
security.
(d) McGuire v. Sigma Coatings' Here, the lender, a bank, was found not
to have been consulted as to how borrower's lessee, which contaminated
property, should conduct its business and that it had no capacity to exert control
over the lessee's handling of hazardous substances.
(ii) Cases Holding Lender Outside Exemption for Participating in
Management
United States v. Nicolet, Inc.61 In this case, the lender, a shareholder
secured a loan to a corporation with a hazardous waste site. Allegations of
s57 45 B.R. 278 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
ss 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
9 23 ENvn.. L REP. 20428 (D. Mass. 1992).
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11934 (E.D. La. 1993).
61 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
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participation in management and operational aspects of facility held sufficient
to withstand summary judgment.
(iii) Cases Holding Exemption Fails Upon Foreclosure
Guidance v. BFG Electroplating & Manufacturing Co.62 Here, the lender,
a bank, held record title, for only eight months, but the court held that
exemption failed upon foreclosure.
(iv) Cases Holding Exemption Will Not Fail If Title Held Primarily to
Protect Security Interest
(a) Snediker Developers Limited Partnership v. Evans.63 Sellers of
property, land contract vendors, retained record title and purchaser took
possession. The court found the arrangement to be similar to sale and lease
back arrangement approved in Bergsoe.
(b) Waterville Industries v. Finance Authority of Maine." Once a sale and
lease back transaction collapsed, the lender, a finance authority, moved within
a reasonably prompt time period (six months) to divest itself of ownership. 1
(c) United States v. McLamb. 5 The lender, a bank, exercised its rights as
a beneficiary under a deed of trust and foreclosed on borrower's property. The
court held that the lender moved within a reasonably prompt time period (seven
months) to divest itself of ownership.
(d) Northeast Doran, Inc. v. Key Bank of Maine." The lender, a bank,
foreclosed on its borrower's property and sold it to a third party. The third
party, in turn, sued the bank for declaratory judgment on the basis, inter alia,
that it was liable as an owner. The court disagreed and held that bank moved
within a reasonably prompt time period (approximately five months) to divest
itself of ownership.
(e) Kemp Industries v. Safety Light Corp.67 Here, the lender, an insurance
company, held title to property through a sale-leaseback agreement to property
that eventually became a Superfund site. Because the defendant's intent was
generation of a lease income stream and not that type of profit opportunity
62 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
63 773 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
" 984 F.2d 549 (1st Cir. 1993).
61 5 F.3d 69 (4th Cir. 1993).
" 15 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994).
67 D.N.J., No. 92-95 (June 28, 1994).
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typically presented by prolonged ownership; that the arrangement placed nearly
all rights and responsibilities with regard to the property with borrower,
including taxes, insurance, assessments, maintenance, and repairs; and because
the borrower gained the primary ownership benefits from the property, the court
held that title was mere indica of ownership held primarily to protect a security
interest.
2. Regulatory Response: EPA's Final Rule on Lender Liability
As one can imagine, a hue and cry arose over all this uncertainty." Pressure
was put on the Environmental Protection Agency by the financial community
as well as certain federal agencies,'c and on April 29, 1992, the Final Rule was
promulgated. ° This comprehensive rule not only concisely addressed and
resolved the ambiguities previously identified by the many decisions discussed
supra, but even anticipated future vagaries as well.'
The first three sections of the rule defined the elements of the secured
creditor exemption: "indicia of ownership, 72 "primarily to protect a security
" See, e.g., Patricia A. Schackelford, Easing the Credit Crunch: A "Functional" Approach to
Lender Control Liability Under CERCLA, 19 B.C. ENvTL. AIF. L REv. 805 (1992).
6 While mobilization from the financial community was to be expected, the more interesting story
relates to the about-face by the federal government. For many years, the Justice Department advocated
strongly for an expansive construction of the term "owner and operator" under CERCLA that would
marginalize the secured creditor exemption and ensnare lending institutions. This effort culminated in the
Fleet Factors decision. At some point soon thereafter, immense pressure was brought by sister federal
agencies, and the Justice Department found itself litigating to save the Final Rule from the attack mounted
by the Chemical Manufacturers Association and the Attorney General of Michigan. In fact, some of the very
same Justice Department attorneys briefed and argued both the Fleet Factors and the Kelley decisions. For
a thorough history of these developments, see William D. Evans, Jr., Exorcising the Polluted Mortgage, 2
DICK. J. ENvTm. L & POL'Y 127, 14749 (1993); Michael G. Greenberg and David M. Shaw, To Lend or Not
to Lend - That Should Not Be the Question.: The Uncertainties of Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 41 DUKE
L.J. 1211, 1239 (1992).
70 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344.
71 For additional commentary and analysis regarding the Final Rule, see Robin A. Goble, EPA's
CERCLA Lender Liability Proposal: Secured Creditors "Hit the Jackpot", 32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 653
(1992); Ronald L Weaver and Jo Clair Spear, Lender Environmental Liability: the EPA's Interpretation of
CERCLA 's Security Interest Exemption, 66 FLA. B.J. 24 (July-August 1992).
7 The Final Rule defined "indicia of ownership" to mean evidence of a security interest, evidence
of an interest in a security interest, or evidence of an interest in real or personal property securing a loan or
other obligation, including any legal or equitable title to real or personal property acquired incident to
foreclosure and its equivalents. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(a).
This section also set forth a list of approved interests, including those which technically vested title
in a lender. They included, but were not limited to, mortgages, deeds of trust, liens, surety bonds and
guarantees of obligations, title held pursuant to a lease financing transaction in which the lessor does not
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interest"' and "participation in management."'74 The last section then exhaus-
initially select the leased property, legal or equitable title obtained pursuant to foreclosure, and their
equivalents. Evidence of indicia also included assignments, pledges, or other rights to or other forms of
encumbrance against property that are held primarily to protect a security interest.
The Final Rule also clarified aspects relating to the holder of indicia, declaring that a "holder"
includes the initial holder, such as the loan originator; any subsequent holder, such as a successor in interest
or subsequent purchaser of the security on the secondary market; a guarantor of an obligation, surety, or any
other person who holds ownership indicia primarily to protect a security interest; or a receiver or other person
who acts on behalf or for the benefit of a holder. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 100(a)(l).
7 In construing the security interest exemption, the Final Rule attempted to clarify what exactly. is
meant by "primarily to protect a security interest" by declaring that it applies where a holder's indicia of
ownership is held primarily for the purpose of securing payment or performance of an obligation. See 40
C.F.R. § 300.1100(b). To provide additional guidance, the Final Rule set forth in laundry list fashion a host
of acceptable security interests, even those technically vesting title in a lender. They included, but were not
limited to, mortgages, deeds of trusts, liens and title pursuant to lease financing transactions. They may also
arise from transactions such as sale and leasebacks, conditional sales, installments sales, trust receipt
transactions, certain assignments, factoring agreements, accounts receivable financing arrangements and
consignments. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 100(b)(l).
While the Final Rule did reassert that the exemption does not apply where indicia of ownership
is held primarily for investment purposes, nor where ownership indicia is held primarily for purposes other
than as protection for a security interest, a holder may have other secondary reasons for maintaining indicia
of ownership. See 40 CFR § 300.1 100(b)(2).
74 Perhaps the most welcome aspect of the Final Rule was its clarification of what constitutes
permissible participation in management In so doing, the Final Rule created two categories of activities: those
that simply are participation in management (and impermissible), 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 100(c)(l), and those that
are not (and sanctioned), 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 100(c)(2).
The first salient aspect of the former category is that actual participation in management or
operational affairs was required in order for a lender to fall outside of the exemption. See 40 C.F.R. §
300.1100(c)(1). Under this section, the "mere capacity to influence," "ability to influence," or the
"unexercised right to control facility operations" standards of Fleet Factors and its progeny were all
specifically rejected. Id.
Further guidance to determine whether a holder is participating in management was provided in
the form of a two-prong test. The test was satisfied if the holder either exercises decisionmaking control over
the borrower's environmental compliance, such that the holder has undertaken responsibility for the
borrower's hazardous substance handling or disposal practices, 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 100(c)(l)(i); or exercised
control at a level comparable to that of a manager of the borrower's enterprise, such that the holder had
assumed or manifested responsibility for the overall management of the enterprise encompassing the day-to-
day decisionmaking of the enterprise with respect to environmental compliance or operational aspects. See
40 C.F.R. §300.1100(c)(1)(ii). A detailed definition of"operational aspects" was also provided. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.1 100(c)(l)(ii)(B).
Detailed guidance was provided as to the second category, actions that are not participation in
management. These permissible actions were also subcategorized based upon the status of the loan
transaction. Where the loan transaction is at its inception, that is, prior to the time that indicia of ownership
are held primarily to protect a security interest, almost any act or omission was allowed. A prospective holder
may undertake or require an environmental inspection of property in which indicia of ownership are to be
held, or require a prospective borrower to clean up property. or to comply or come into compliance with any
applicable law or regulation. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 100(c)(2)(i).
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tively documented what activities would and would not be sanctioned during
foreclosure" and following foreclosure! 6 While the Final Rule went to great
The second phase of permissible activities typically arose during policing and workout and were
considered under the Final Rule to be consistent with holding ownership indicia primarily to protect a security
interest. During the policing stage, for example, a lender was allowed to require the borrower to clean up
property during the term of the security interest; require the borrower to comply or come into compliance with
applicable federal, state and local environmental and other laws, rules and regulations during the term of the
security interest; secure or exercise authority to monitor or inspect property or the borrower's business or
financial condition; or take other appropriate action to adequately police the loan or security interest such as
requiring the borrower to comply with any warranties, covenants, conditions, representations or promises. See
40 C.F.R. § 300.1 100(c)(2)(ii)(A).
During workout, a holder was allowed to take action which sought to prevent, cure or mitigate a
default by the borrower or to preserve or prevent the diminution in value of the security. Permissible workout
activities would have included, but were not limited to, restructuring or renegotiating the terms of the security
interest; requiring payment of additional rent or interest; exercising forbearance; requiring or exercising rights
pursuant to an assignment of accounts or other amounts owing to an obligor; requiring or exercising rights
pursuant to an escrow agreement pertaining to amounts owing to an obligor; providing specific or general
financial or other advice, suggestions, counseling or guidance; and exercising any right or remedy the holder
is entitled to by law or under any warranties, covenants, conditions, representations or promises from the
borrower. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 100(c)(2)(ii)(B).
7 This section of the Final Rule repudiated that line of cases holding that the exemption failed upon
the lender taking title. In additional to the traditional method of foreclosure, a wide array of mechanisms
through which a lender may acquire title primarily to protect is security interest was approved. The Final Rule
referred to this array as "foreclosure and its equivalents" and included not only purchase at a foreclosure sale,
but acquisition or assignment of title in ieu of foreclosure, termination of a lease or other repossession,
acquisition of a right to title or possession, an agreement in satisfaction of obligations, or any other formal or
informal manner by which the holder acquires title to or possession of the secured property. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.1100(d)(1).
Immediately following foreclosure, the Final Rule allowed indicia of ownership to continue to be
maintained primarily as protection for a security interest provided that the holder undertakes to sell, re-lease
property held pursuant to a lease financing transaction, or otherwise divest itself of the property in a
reasonably expeditious manner, using whatever commercially reasonable means are relevant or appropriate
with respect to the property, taking all facts and circumstances into consideration. However, a holder that
outbids, rejects or fails to act upon a written bona fide, firm offer of fair consideration for the property was
not considered to hold indicia of ownership primarily to protect a security interest. In such an instance, the
exemption would fail. Id.
Specific guidance was provided relating to a lender's actions to divest itself of title. A lender that,
within twelve months following foreclosure, lists the property with a broker, dealer or agent who deals with
the type of property in question, or that advertises the property as being for sale or disposition on at least a
monthly basis in either a real estate publication or a trade or other publication suitable for the property in
question, or a newspaper of general circulation stayed within the exemption. See 40 C.F.R. §
300.1 100(d)(2)(i). A lender could not outbid, reject or fail to act upon an offer of fair consideration for the
property, unless the lender is required, in order to avoid liability under federal or state law, to make a higher
bid, to obtain a higher offer, or to seek or obtain an offer in a different manner. See 40 C.F.R. §
300.1 100(d)(2)(ii). Fair consideration was defined as follows:
An amount equal to or in excess of the sum of the outstanding principal owed to the lender
immediately preceding acquisition of full title pursuant to foreclosure, plus any unpaid interest,
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lengths to clarify the secured creditor exemption, it also made clear that nothing
therein would preclude liability incurred in connection with a lender's activities
related to arranging for disposal or treatment of a hazardous substance" or
accepting hazardous substances for transportation and disposal.78 See 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.1100(d)(3).
During the relatively brief period of its existence, the Final Rule, in the
majority of cases, was applied by several courts in a fashion favorable to
lenders.79 However, on the last day possible, the state of Michigan and the
rent or penalties, plus all reasonable and necessary costs, fees or other charges incurred by the
holder incident to work out, foreclosure and its equivalents, retention, maintaining the business
activities of the enterprise, preserving, protecting and preparing the vessel or facility prior to sale,
re-lease of property held pursuant to a lease financing transaction, plus response costs incurred
under section 107(d)(1) of CERCLA or at the direction of an on-scene coordinator; less any
amounts received by the lender in connection with any partial disposition of the property, net
revenues received as a result of maintaining the business activities of the enterprise, and any
amounts paid by the borrower subsequent to the acquisition of full title. 40 C.F.R. §
300.11 00(d)(2)(ii)(A).
A lender was considered to have rejected fair consideration where it outbids, rejects or fails to act
upon within 90 days of receipt of a written, bona fide, firm offer of fair consideration received at any time
after six months following foreclosure and its equivalents. A "written, bona fide, firm offer" was defined as
a legally enforceable, commercially reasonable, cash offer solely for the foreclosed facility or vessel, including
all material terms of the transaction, from a ready, willing, and able purchaser who demonstrates to the
holder's satisfaction the ability to perform. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 100(d)(2)(ii)(B).
76 The Final Rule provides detailed guidance to lenders who find themselves holding foreclosed
property for disposition and liquidation. Specifically, a holder may sell, re-lease property held pursuant to a
lease financing transaction, liquidate, maintain business activities, wind up operations, undertake any response
action under CERCLA section 107(d)(l) or under the direction of an on-scene coordinator, and take measures
to preserve, protect or prepare the secured asset prior to sale or other disposition without voiding the
exemption. See 40 CFR § 300.1 100(d)(2).
77 See CERCLA § 107(a)(3); see also United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 821 F. Supp. 707 (S.D.
Ga. 1993).
79 See CERCLA § 107(a)(4).
79 Only a few decisions were reached while the Final Rule was in effect that actually applied its
provisions either independently of or in conjunction with the secured creditor exemption under the statute.
See Ashland Oi Inc. v. Sonford Products Corp., 810 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Minn. 1992) (lender engaging in
routine lending and bankruptcy workout activities, including selling assets and holding title to former tenant's
assets for three to four weeks, not liable); Kelley v. Tiscornia, 810 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (holding
that lender's demand that borrower obtain new management, regular consultations with borrower, monitoring
of borrower's financial conditions, installing two representatives on borrower's board of directors, issuing
letter of credit to secure payment of bonus for borrower's chief executive officer based on reduction of
company's indebtedness to bank, issuing statements concerning power of borrower's chief executive officer
and owner to fire employees and asserting influence over workout specialist were all sanctioned by Final
Rule); United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 821 F. Supp. 707 (S.D. Ga. 1993) (lender's agents' handling of
hazardous substances on site and failure to vacate the property in reasonably expeditious manner were all
outside Final Rule, triggering liability); see also Richard A. Spehr, Lenders Find Safe Harbor as Courts
Uphold Environmental Protection Agency Rule Limiting CERCLA Liability, 22 REAL EST. L. J. 66 (1993);
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Chemical Manufactures Association sued to overturn the rule. In February of
1994, the Appellate Court for the D.C. Circuit handed down the Kelley decision
vacating the Final Rule and suggesting that the EPA and the Clinton
Administration seek relief from Congress.' The court held the Final Rule could
not stand as either a substantive or legislative rule because, inter alia, Congress
gave the courts and not the EPA authority to interpret questions of liability."
C. Impact of Vacation and Current Status of Liability
The immediate effect of the Kelley case, and this is especially so for lenders
in the Eleventh Circuit, is that the Fleet Factors' doctrine once again controls.
While some cases have been decided in favor of lenders during the existence
of the Final Rule though independent of it and in reliance solely on the statutory
secured creditor exemption, 3 these cases offer negligible solace. Until the
Eleventh Circuit directly speaks once more to the issue of the secured creditor
exemption and clarifies the standards previously enunciated, under no
circumstances should a lender assume the more permissive doctrines apply.
IV. SECURED CREDITOR LIABILITY UNDER FLORIDA LAW
While scattered about in haphazard fashion, there are ample provisions
under Florida law for private and public parties to recover environmental
response costs. These provisions can be found in Chapters 403 and 376,
respectively, of the Florida Statutes.
A. Hazardous Substances in General: Chapter 403, Florida Statutes
Fla. Stat. § 403.727(4) provides the Florida Department of Environmental
Protection with a CERCLA-type liability scheme for the recovery of costs
William D. Evans, Ashland Oil v. Sonford Products Corp., Kelley v. Tiscornia, and United States v. Fleet
Factors Corp.: Upholding EPA's Lender Liability Rule, 29 TORT & INS. L. J. 141 (1993).
80 Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994). reh'g denied, 25 F.3d 1088 (memorandum
opinion).
81 Id. at 1108.
n Supra Section m.B.l.c.
93 Northeast Doran, Inc. v. Key Bank of Maine, 15 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994); Waterville Indus., Inc.
v. Finance Authority of Maine, 984 F.2d 549 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. McLamb, 5 F.3d 69 (4th Cir
1993); McGuire v. Sigma Coatings, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11934 (E.D. La. 1993); Grantors to the Silresin
Site Trust v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 23 ENVTL. L. REP. 20428 (D. Mass. 1992).
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associated with releases and threatened releases of hazardous substances.
Similar and narrow CERCLA-type defenses are available as well." While the
state and federal schemes in broad respects mirror one another, the former
departs from the latter in at least one material aspect - the lack of any secured
creditor exemption.85
B. Protection of Ground and Surface Waters: Chapter 376, Florida
Statutes
The Department of Environmental Protection may also recover
environmental response costs under Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, which,
84 See Fla. Stat. § 403.727(5), which provides as follows:
The following defenses are available to a person alleged to be in violation of this act, who shall plead and
prove that the alleged violation was solely the result of any of the following or combination of the following:
(a) An act of war.
(b) An act of government, either state, federal, or local, unless the person claiming the defense is
a governmental body, in which case this defense is available only by acts of other governmental
bodies.
(c) An act of God, which means only an unforeseeable act exclusively occasioned by the violence
of nature without the interference of any human agency.
(d) An act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the defendant or other
than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship existing,
directly or indirectly, with the defendant, except when the sole contractual arrangement arises
from a published tariff and acceptance for carriage by a common carrier by rail, if the defendant
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that:
1. The defendant exercised due care with respect to the biomedical or hazardous waste
concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such biomedical or
hazardous waste, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances; and
2. The defendant took precautions against foreseeable acts or omission of any such
third party and against the consequences that could foreseeably result from such act
or omissions.
85 Another material difference, but one outside the scope of this article, is the lack of provisions for
either private or governmental parties regarding consistency with the National Contingency Plan ("NCP").
The NCP, developed by the EPA, pursuant to CERCLA § 105 and codified at 40 C.F.R. Pt. 300, is a
comprehensive regulatory document addressing all phases of a Superfund response action, including the
means for site identification, investigation, ranking, selection of cleanup alternative and preferred remedies
and implementation of any final selected remedy. Both private and governmental parties must comply with
the NCP pursuant to applicable standards. Failure to do so in any substantial respect can result in the denial
of recovery of response costs. Compare Pierson Sand & Gravel v. Pierson Tp., 851 F. Supp. 850, 855-58
(N.D. Ohio 1994) (non-compliance) with Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 24 F.3d 1565 (9th Cir.
1994) (compliance); see also James R. Geason, Clear as Mud: The Function of the National Contingency
Plan Consistency Requirement in a CERCLA Private Cost Recovery Action, 28 GA.L. REv. 555 (1994);
Charles C. Steincamp, Toeing the Line: Compliance with the National Contingency Plan for Private Party
Cost Recovery Under CERCLA, 32 WASH. Li. 190 (1993).
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generally speaking, regulates discharges to surface and ground waters of the
state. Section 376.308 is another detailed liability scheme identifying categories
of liable parties16 and very narrow defenses.' Liability under this section differs
from liability under Chapter 403, Florida Statutes, in that § 376.308 allows for
an explicit, albeit limited, exemption for secured lenders. The exemption is
limited in two separate ways. First, it applies only to petroleum releases.
Second, it does not apply to any entity or individual holding indicia of
ownership primarily to protect a security interest; it applies only to financial
institutions."8
Arguably, a cause of action exists for the recovery of costs private parties
incur to respond to hazardous substance contamination under sections
376.313(3) and 376.302(1)(a), Florida Statutes. 9 Section 376.313(3) provides
in part that "nothing contained in ss. 376.30-376.319 prohibits any person from
bringing a cause of action in a court of competent jurisdiction for all damages
resulting from a discharge or other condition of pollution covered by ss.
376.30-376.319 (emphasis added)." Thus, a private party may recover the costs
it is forced to incur to ameliorate damages caused by another as a result of any
regulated event prohibited by sections 376.30-376.319, Florida Statutes.
Section 376.302(1)(a), Florida Statutes, in particular prohibits the discharge of
hazardous substances into or upon surface or ground water. While private
parties may therefore sue for cost recovery under state law, lenders in this
instance still will have recourse to the limited secured creditor defense set forth
in section 376.308(3), Florida Statutes.
Fla. Stat. §§ 376.308(l)(a)-(c) (1993).
Fla. Stat. §§ 376.308(l)(c), (2)(a)-(d), (3) (1993).
n Fla. Stat. § 376.308(3) provides that financial institutions are exempt in three circumstances: (i)
where they serve as trustee, personal representative, or other type of fiduciary; (ii) where they hold indicia of
ownership primarily to protect a security interest and have not divested the borrower of, or otherwise engaged
in, decisionmaking control over site operations, particularly with respect to the storage, use, or disposal of
petroleum or petroleum products, and (iii) where they have foreclosed and seek to sell or otherwise divest
themselves of the security at the earliest possible time. The exemption also allows a financial institution to
compel the borrower to maintain compliance with environmental statutes and rules and to act to prevent or
abate a discharge.
s9 While the scope of recovery afforded a private party under section 376.313(3) is open to
interpretation and has been subject to debate, at least one court has ruled that recovery is limited to the costs
associated with responding to hazardous substance contamination, i.e., remediation costs and not any real or
imagined diminution in value to property. See Mostoufi v. Presto Food Stores, Inc., 618 So. 2d 1372 (Fla.
2nd DCA 1993).
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V. SECURED CREDITOR LIABILITY UNDER CHAPTER 24,
DADE COUNTY CODE
In analyzing the risk posed to lenders by collateral which may become
environmentally distressed, there is more to be considered than the potential
liability posed by CERCLA and any of its state counterparts. A practitioner is
well advised to consult applicable ordinances or laws promulgated by a local
government or municipality. It would not be out of the ordinary to discover
there is another significant source of exposure, at least to a governmental entity.
Chapter 24 of the Dade County Code (the "Code"), otherwise known as the
Metropolitan Dade County Environmental Protection Ordinance,' controls and
regulates activities which are causing or may cause pollution or contamination
of air, water, soil and property within Dade County. Sections 24-54 through 24-
57 set forth the enforcement, penalty and liability scheme for any violation of
Chapter 24, which is itself divided into four distinct and separate articles.9'
Lenders and their counsel should focus on section 24-57(g), a little discussed
and less understood component which nonetheless has serious ramifications
and provides as follows:
Whenever a violation of this chapter occurs or exists, or has occurred
or existed, any person, individually or otherwise, who has a legal,
beneficial, or equitable interest in the facility or instrumentality causing
or contributing to the violation or who has a legal beneficial or
equitable interest in the real property upon which such violation occurs
or exists, or has occurred or existed, shall be jointly and severally liable
for said violation regardless of fault and regardless of knowledge of the
violation. This provision shall be construed to impose joint and
severable liability, regardless of fault and regardless of knowledge of
the violation, upon all persons, individually or otherwise, who,
90 § 24-1, Dade County Code.
91 Article I, sections 24-1 through 24-57, is a general catchall category, containing, in addition to
enforcement, penalty and liability provisions, inter alia, definitions, water quality standards, provisions for
the protection of water supply and wellfields and regulations relating to underground storage facilities, the
handling of petroleum and petroleum products and the spraying of substances containing asbestos. Article fl,
sections 24-58 through 24-59.2 addresses construction and other activities in canals, tidal water, submerged
bay-bottom lands, coastal wetlands and freshwater wetlands. Article I1l, sections 24-60 through 24-60.9.
regulates tree removal and provides for preservation and protection. Article IV, section 24-61, is the
Metropolitan Dade County Stormwater Ordinance.
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although said persons may no longer have any such legal, beneficial or
equitable interest in said facility or instrumentality or real property, did
have such an interest at any time during which such violation existed
or occurred or continued to exist or occur. This provision shall be
liberally construed and shall be retroactively applied to protect the
public health, safety, and welfare and to accomplish the purposes of
this chapter.
Lost in the verbiage are at least four different elements which are more
readily apparent when broken up as follows:
(1) Whenever a VIOLATION of this chapter occurs or exists, or has
occurred or existed,
(2) any person, individually or otherwise, who has a LEGAL,
BENEFICIAL, OR EQUITABLE INTEREST
(3) in the facility or instrumentality causing or contributing to the
violation or who has a legal, beneficial or equitable interest in the real
property upon which such violation occurs or exists, or has occurred
or existed,
(4) shall be JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE FOR
(5) SAID VIOLATION
(6) REGARDLESS OF FAULT AND REGARDLESS OF KNOWLEDGE of the
violation.
(7) This provision shall be construed to impose joint and severable
liability, regardless of fault and regardless of knowledge of the
violation, UPON ALL PERSONS, individually or otherwise, WHO,
ALTHOUGH SAID PERSONS MAY NO LONGER HAVE ANY SUCH LEGAL,
BENEFICIAL OR EQUITABLE INTEREST in said facility or instrumentality
or real property, DID HAVE SUCH AN INTEREST AT ANY TIME DURING
WHICH SUCH VIOLATION EXISTED OR OCCURRED OR CONTINUED TO
EXIST OR OCCUR.
(8) This provision shall be LIBERALLY CONSTRUED and shall be
RETROACTIVELY APPLIED to protect the public health, safety, and
welfare and to accomplish the purposes of this chapter.
The first important element of this section is located in paragraph (2). As
the ordinance covers "any person with a legal, beneficial or equitable interest,"
secured creditors are specifically included. There is no exemption by which a
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secured creditor may shield itself from the liability incurred by its borrower.92
This is a major deviation from the federal scheme and, therefore, should put
lenders holding collateral in Dade County on notice that great care needs to be
taken to define, limit and manage environmental risk.
The second important element of this section addresses the scope of
liability which may be incurred and is, itself, divided, into several sub-elements.
First, review of paragraphs (4), (6) and (7) reveals a familiar CERCLA type
structure: liability is strict, joint and several and retroactive. However, a major
deviation and another significant source of concern for lenders is revealed in
paragraphs (1) and (5), for it is here indicated that liability is triggered for any
violation of Chapter 24. A lender could thus incur liability not only for
CERCLA-type contamination situations but for any other infraction its
borrower commits as set forth in Chapter 24 of the Code. A lender may also be
responsible for administrative penalties assessed against its borrower. As
DERM may assess fines at up to $25,000 per violation per day,93 this avenue
poses a very real additional source of liability which must be considered.
The third significant element of this section is found in paragraph (7) and,
again, extends liability beyond traditional boundaries established under
CERCLA case law. In a CERCLA context, under certain circumstances, a
potentially responsible party ("PRP") may maneuver out of the chain of
liability. This is arguably so if (i) the PRP acquires property after a release has
occurred and after a release has ceased to occur; (ii) the PRP does not
exacerbate or contribute to the past release and (iii) if the PRP is no longer a
current owner when contamination is discovered. 9' Similarly, in certain
jurisdictions, a PRP may also escape liability where there are "passive"
9 This is only absolutely the case for regulations set forth in Articles I, I and IV. The one exception
to this rule is found in Article HI, at section 24-60(5), which provides a limited mortgagee exemption for a
borrower's violation of the regulations relating to tree protection. This exception however, is extremely narrow
and fails upon (i) foreclosure; (ii) a secured party's participation in the management and control of the
collateral; or (iii) where the secured party itself has effected or caused the tree ordinance violations.
The existence of this exemption should provide little, if any, consolation, to lenders. That is, while
it will infrequently, if ever, be the case that a lender will incur liability under Article HI, the mere existence
of the exemption will go a long way on the County's behalf in serving to uphold an interpretation of section
24-57(g) which denies the existence of a secured creditor exemption. In other words, a persuasive argument
can and will be made that the drafters of the Code knew how to craft a secured creditor exemption, they did
so in this limited instance pertaining to Article I, and their failure to enact a similar provision in Article I
indicated that this was a conscious effort on their part.
93 § 25-57(a), Dade County Code.
% Richard H. Mays, I CERCLA LJTIGATION, ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE MANUAL §7.04, at
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releases." However, the drafters of the Code have seemingly closed even these
narrow loopholes.
The Code assesses liability against "all persons ... who, although said
persons may no longer have any such legal, beneficial or equitable interest in
said facility... did have such an interest at any time during which such
violation existed or occurred or continued to exist or occur." The operative
language here is "did have such an interest at any time during which such
violation existed." Thus, for example, consider a situation where a lender holds
as collateral property upon which a spill of hazardous solvents occurred. This
spill occurred suddenly, prior to the establishment of the lender's security
interest, and was not discovered at any time until after the loan was repaid and
the interest terminated. However, the groundwater standards beneath the
property were violated by the spill and continued to be violated, unbeknownst
to anybody, during the term of the security interest's existence. Under
CERCLA, without more, no liability arguably should attach. Under a plain
reading of the Code, however, a lender would be rendered liable.
The final significant element of this section is found in paragraph (8). Here,
the drafters directed that the section should be liberally construed to protect
public health, safety, and welfare and purposes of this chapter. This language
ensures that its many far reaching provisions will be upheld. And, indeed, it is,
inter alia, this exact language that the Florida Third District Court of Appeals
relied upon in Seaboard System R.R., Inc. v. Clemente,' upholding several
critical aspects of the ordinance.98 While the Third District Court of Appeals
did not pass on a secured lender's liability in this case, it is likely that this issue
would withstand judicial scrutiny as well.
95 See Snediker Developers Ltd Partnership v. Evans, 773 F. Supp. 984, 988-99 (E.D. Mich. 1991);
Ecodyne Corp. v. Shah, 718 F. Supp. 1454 (N.D. Cal. 1989); but see State ofN.Y. v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d 1032 (2nd Cir. 1985) (holding that leaking, continued leaching and seepage frm earlier spills constitutes
"release"); see also Henry L. Stephens, Jr., When Is "Leaching" Not "Leaking": CERCLA Liability of
Owners and Operators at the Time of Disposal, 24 ENvrL. L. REP. 10177 (April 1994).
96 § 25-57(g), Dade County Code.
97 467 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
9 The Seaboard Case upheld the joint and several and strict liability provisions of section 24-57(g).
It specifically upheld retroactive application based on the environmental protection benefits accorded the
public:
The newly enacted ordinance, section 24-57(g), merely defines and delineates the scope and
breadth of the strict liability imposed under the previously existing environmental protection
provisions of Chapter 24 .... Furthermore, we do not find retroactive application of this
ordinance unduly harsh in a due process sense since the environmental protection benefits
accorded the public by this provision far exceed any burden imposed upon appellants.
Id. at 358.
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VI. DEFINING, MANAGING, AND DOCUMENTING
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK
Regardless of the many risks and uncertainties facing lenders on the
federal, state and local level, some financial opportunities will be so otherwise
attractive that a business decision is made to go forward. And indeed, while
environmental risk can never be eliminated in its entirety, it can certainly be
defined, managed and documented against such that the decision to go forward
is both reasonable and prudent. This next section identifies strategies, programs
and methods to this end which operate to ameliorate judicial, regulatory and
legislative failures.
A. Pick Appropriate Loan Vehicle
The EPA's Final Rule embraced the full panoply of loan financing
arrangements, including traditional mortgage arrangements as well as those
vesting title in the lender, such as sale and lease back arrangements. 99 With its
vacation, lenders in the Eleventh Circuit have no specific guidance on this
score, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has not spoken on this issue. Other
courts have gone both ways."o° While the majority of courts, both on the trial
and appellate level, look to a lender's intent in structuring the transaction,'0 '
there have been decisions which take the more crabbed and formalistic
approach."02 To afford itself an additional protection where an "alternative"-
type vehicle is chosen, such as a financing lease, joint venture or deed absolute,
a lender is advised to restrict the borrower's ability to unilaterally abandon its
interest in the property., 3 A further right a lender will want to obtain in
negotiating the loan is that which would allow the lender to unilaterally deed
title to the borrower without affecting the borrower's payment obligations.
99 See supra note 68.
100 Compare Guidance v. BFG Electroplating & Manufacturing Co., 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa.
1989) with Snediker Developers Limited Partnership v. Evans, 773 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
101 See Section I1.B.I.e.(iv), supra.
102 Notwithstanding the theoretical nature of this dichotomy, lenders in Dade County have no such
dilemma to ponder. As any legal, equitable or beneficial interest whatsoever in property is sufficient to
implicate a lender, the qualitative title analysis is rendered irrelevant and immaterial.
103 See Paula Thornton Perkins, Abandonment in the Face of Possible Toxic Contamination: What's
a Lender to Do?, 44 Sw. L. J. 1563 (1991).
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B. Investigate Collateral and Borrower
Perhaps the most important precaution a lender can take is the performance
of a thorough pre-loan investigation of the collateral offered as security and of
the borrower him or herself." In some cases a less formal transaction screen
will be appropriate. In others, an American Society of Testing Materials
("ASTM") "phase I audit"-type investigation will be required. 5 In heavily
industrialized areas, inquiry into surrounding properties is appropriate. Where
the borrower maintains ongoing operations, an investigation into any past
enforcement action taken against him would be prudent as well. While the
importance of environmental investigation when entering into a loan transaction
cannot be underestimated,"r the very real possibility that contamination may
104 See Malcolm D. Griggs, Lender Audits May Yield Dividends, 5 ENVTL. PROTECTION 48 (1994).
1o5 A "phase I auditf or site assessment is the most common and thorough way in which to establish
an environmental baseline. While the nature and scope of a phase I audit may vary depending on the
circumstances, it usually involves a physical inspection of the property, and review of prior uses, aerial
photographs and environmental agency records. Sometimes more intrusive, or "phase I1"-type inquiry, is
necessary. The ASTM has recently promulgated a protocol which is the emerging industry standard. See
James W. Conrad, Jr., Sliding Scale or Slippery Slope? The New ASTM's Standard Practices for
Environmental Site Assessments, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. 10181 (Month Year). There is at least one other
institutional protocol, promulgated by the Resolution Trust Company. See RTC Guidance for Phase I
Environmental Site Assessments, published in ENVIRoNMENTAL DUE DILIGENCE GUIDE (BNA), at 501:1241
(January 22, 1993). Fannie Mae also has developed extensive and comprehensive "phased" guidance which
a lender must follow to assess and monitor the environmental condition of property pledged as security for
a mortgage. See Fannie Mae DUS Guide, Part X - Environmental Hazards Management Procedures,
published in ENVIRONMENTAL DUE DILIGENCE GUIDE (BNA), at 131:801 (April 25, 1994). The Office of
Thrift Supervision has issued guidance as well. However, this document is not as formalized or
comprehensive as any of the foregoing. See Office of Thrift Supervision Guidelines on Environmental Risk
and Liability (Thrift Bulletin 16), published in ENvIRONMENTAL DE DILIGENCE GUIDE (BNA), at 501:1221
(Feb. 6, 1989).
106 In April of 1993, Environmental Data Resources, Inc. surveyed thirty-five U.S. commercial banks.
The table below, compiled as a result of that survey, reflects those operating areas subject to a formalized
policy of environmental review.
OPERATONAL AREAS SUBJECT TO
FORMALIZED POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW
I. Commercial Real Estate
A. Loan Origination 88%
B. Loan Renewal 81%
C. Real Estate Owned ("REO")/Foreclosure 92%
U. Single Family Residential Real Estate
A. Loan Origination 38%
B. Loan Renewal 35%
C. REO/Foreclosure 42%
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have occurred during the life of the loan as well suggests the need to conduct
further investigation prior to foreclosure." 7
C. Impose Appropriate Transactional and Documentary Protections
Various transactional and documentary measures, have been specifically
developed to identify, manage and marginalize the environmental risk posed by
a borrower and its collateral." Where a problem is known and contamination
has been discovered, a lender may require that a borrower escrow a certain
portion of the financing to fund remediationY' 9 A lender may also simply
Ill. Non-Real Estate Secured Transaction
A. Equipment 27%
B. Receivables 23%
The survey principally reveals that almost all the institutions surveyed subject commercial loan
transactions collateralized by real property to a formalized policy of environmental review. The survey
also reflects, understandably, that the percentages drop dramatically when residential real estate is
involved. However, where loans are secured by personalty or receivables, the lowest percentages are
indicated. This result is curious given that banks incur the same sort of onerous liability where receivables
and assets become contaminated or are the source of contamination. See, e.g., Polger v. Republic Nat'l
Bank, 709 F. Supp. 204 (D. Colo. 1989).
An operational area not addressed by the survey but of significant concern is the bank trust
department. A recent decision indicates that trust departments, trustees and fiduciaries are subject to the
same kind of risks as lenders. In Phoenix v. Garbage Services, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5970 (D.Az. April
5, 1993), a federal district court in Arizona held a trustee personally liable for the hazardous
contamination of a landfill site. Remediation costs there were estimated to run as high as $60 million. See
also Michele B. Corash and Robert J. Reinhard, Liability of Institutional Trustees Under CERCLA, 3
DUKE ENVTL. L & POL'Y F. 1 (1993); F. James Handley, Trustee Liability Under CERCLA, 24 ENVrL. L
REP. 10479 (August 1994); Edward N. Polisher and Clifford S. Meyer, Clothing the Emperor - An
Update Respoluing to City of Phoenix v. Garbage Services Company, 132 TR. & EST. 41 (1993).
107 There is additional incentive to do so. The "innocent landowner" defense set forth at CERCLA
§ 101(35) requires that those relying on it conducted all appropriate inquiry into previous ownership and uses
at the time of acquisition. Performing a phase I audit immediately prior to foreclosure will allow a lender to
invoke the defense. See Banks as Innocent Owners in Forfeiture Cases, Carl H. Lowenson Jr. and Kathleen
Fallon, N.Y. LJ., March 17, 1993, at 1.
108 See, e.g., Charles E. Davidson, Environmental Considerations in Loan Documentation, 106
BANKING L. J. 308 (1989); Aimmee L. Manocchio Nason, How to Environmentally Assess Your Loan
Documentation after Fleet Factors, 2 DICK. J. ENVTL L. & POL'Y 157 (1993).
,o9 This, however, will not suffice to adequately protect a lender from incurring liability or other
environmental loss. The facts and result memorialized in U.S. v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 25 F.3d 66 (2nd Cir.
1994), present a cautionary tale and underscore the important role that appropriate documentary protections
play in an overall environmental risk management program. Here, a foreign bank lent $7 million to a company
to develop property located within a known Superfund site. The bank was aware of this designation and thus
required the borrower to hold back $1 million of the loan proceeds to fund the remediation. Apparently
confident that it had successfully limited its exposure, the bank failed to closely monitor the borrower, nor did
it provide a vehicle to do so. It had failed to require the borrower to provide regular notification regarding
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require the borrower to supplement the offered collateral. In this instance, the
lender should reserve the right to foreclose on any part of the security
individually. In the main, however, contamination will not have occurred or
will be either undiscovered or unrevealed. Therefore, a lender must provide for
and against the unknown. While documenting around, through or against the
possibility of contamination is certainly not a panacea, it does complement the
other methods discussed in this article and will provide some recognizable
benefits. Sample provisions include those that would require the borrower to:
" Comply with all federal, state and local environmental laws;
* Refrain from or limit the use, generation, treatment, storage or disposal
of any hazardous substance on site, or prohibit the sublease to or affiliation with
any entity that does;
0 Notify the lender whenever any material amount of hazardous
substance is spilled, deposited or discovered on site;
0 Notify the lender of any orders, requests, notifications or other written
or verbal communication from any government agency or private party relating
to the presence, suspected presence or potential presence of any hazardous
substance on site, from any source;
* Indemnify the lender against any liability arising out of the presence or
release of any hazardous substance;
" Obtain environmental impairment insurance in favor of the lender;" °
" Permit the lender to enter the property for purposes of environmental
testing or the determination of compliance; and
0 Where permitted under state law, reconvey any security subsequently
discovered to be contaminated, and treat the loan as unsecured, if necessary.
remediation activities. Nor did the bank receive any notification regarding pending developments from the
EPA. At the time, the Final Rule was still in effect, and as the EPA, per the Final Rule, did not consider the
bank a PRP, it simply declined to provide the bank with information.
Eventually, the various PRPs entered into a settlement decree whereby future land uses would be
severely curtailed and deed restrictions required. In short, the decree severely crippled, if not altogether
extinguished, the marketability of the property. The issue before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was
whether the bank was entitled to intervene at such a late date, following entry of the consent decree. In holding
that the bank was not, the court admonished that a "sophisticated" lender must either keep in touch with its
borrower or in some other way closely monitor the situation. Id. at 71 ("Such parties are responsible for
monitoring their collateral themselves, and it may reasonably be assumed that a lender of nearly seven million
dollars will keep in contact with its debtor to protect its interest in the loan.")
110 See John L. Riedl & Armin R. Callo, Financial Institution Environmental Liability Insurance:
New Panacea for Lenders' Pollution Ills, 4 ENvT.. CLAIMs J. 359 (1994); see also David J. Barberie,
Dimmitt Chevrolet v. Southeastern Fidelity Insurance Corp.: Reaching in the Wrong Pocket?, 9 J. LAND USE
& ENVIL. L 161 (1993); Walter E. Engle Ill, Dimmitt Chevrolet v. Southeastern Fidelity Insurance Corp.:
Florida Interprets the "Sudden and Accidental" Clause, 44 MERcER L. REv. 1387 (1993).
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D. Develop Consistent Loan Servicing Practices
In order to protect not only assets but future rights and options regarding
collateral, consistent attention to loans presenting known environmental risks
are extremely important. Where collateral is involved in ongoing remediation
activities, counsel should be engaged to monitor the proceedings and be
provided with all agency documentation received by the lender, especially all
notices of hearing and/or settlement. Similarly, where the borrower has been
required to supply documentation of compliance, scrutinize such proof
closely."'
E. FDIC Guidelines
While the preceding section sets forth comprehensive procedures and
transactional considerations to protect a lender from being exposed to
environmental risk and liability, FDIC institutional lenders have been provided
and are subject to additional protocols. On February 23, 1993, the FDIC issued
its Guidelines for an Environmental Risk Program ("FDIC Guidelines"). The
preamble states only that a lending institution should have in place appropriate
safeguards and controls to limit exposure to environmental liability. A close
reading of the document, however, makes clear that these are much more than
suggested procedures.
Examiners will review an institution's environmental risk program as
part of the examination of its lending and investment activities. When
analyzing individual credits, examiners will review the institution's
compliance with its own environmental risk program. Failure to
establish or comply with an appropriate environmental program will be
criticized and corrective action required."'
The FDIC Guidelines require that a lender's environmental risk
management program be formalized, not ad hoc, and integrated into an
institution's overall decisionmaking process. The more salient aspects of the
See also Peter G. Glubiak, Loan Policies for Environmental Matters, 6 PROB. & PROP. 30 (May-
June 1992).
112 Id. at 1.
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environmental risk management program set forth in the FDIC Guidelines are
as follows:
* The Board of Directors should review and approve the environmental
risk management program.
* A senior officer knowledgeable in environmental matters should be
designated responsible for implementation of the environmental risk
management program.
* As not all institutional lending requires the same level of environmental
scrutiny, the environmental risk management program can be tailored to
individual needs.
* The program should provide for staff training,"' set environmental
policy guidelines and procedures," 4 require environmental review or analysis
during the application process," 5 include loan documentation standards" 6 and
establish appropriate environmental risk assessment safeguards" 7 in loan
workout situations and foreclosures.
13 Training should be sufficient to ensure that the environmental risk management program is
implemented and followed within the institution and that the appropriate personnel have knowledge and
experience to determine and evaluate potential environmental concerns that might affect the institution.
However, when the complexity of the environmental issue is beyond the expertise of staff, outside
professional counsel should be consulted.
114 Loan policies that affect collateral posing an environmental risk should be reduced to writing and
incorporated into formalized lending manuals. Furthermore, these lending manuals are suggested to identify
types of environmental risk associated with industries and real estate in the lender's trade area, provide
guidelines for conducting analysis of environmental liability and describe procedures for resolution of
potential environmental concerns. The FDIC Guidelines suggest that the same procedures apply to credit
monitoring, loan workout situations and foreclosures.
"1 The environmental risk analysis should be conducted prior to making loan, i.e., during the
application process. Most relevant information can be gathered by account officers when interviewing a loan
applicant concerning his or her business activities. The application itself should contain relevant inquiries
related to present and past uses of the property, and the occurrence of any contacts by federal, state or local
government agencies about environmental matters. It is also suggested, but not required, that the loan officer
or other representative visit the site to note obvious visual evidence of environmental concerns.
Where the initial review indicates a possible environmental concern, the FDIC deems appropriate
a more detailed, structured investigation by qualified personnel. On this score, an ASTM phase I audit type
review is recommended, encompassing a survey of past ownership and uses of the property, inspection of site
and contiguous parcels of property, review of company records for past use or disposal of hazardous materials,
review of regulatory records, and review of historical aerial photographs.
,16 The FDIC Guidelines specifically identify language which would require the borrower to comply
with all environmental laws, disclose information about the environmental status of collateral, and grant the
institution the right to acquire additional information by inspecting the collateral.
"17 In order for a lender to maximize the protection afforded by an environmental risk management
program, the FDIC Guidelines suggest that an environmental risk assessment is an ongoing process which
should continue during the life of a loan by monitoring the borrower and collateral for potential environmental
concerns. Specific attention should be directed to any changes in business activities, operations or processes
of the borrower that might result in significant increased environmental risk.
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As the foregoing demonstrates, the FDIC recommends a fairly aggressive
posture regarding the evaluation and management of environmental risk posed
by a borrower, its operations and collateral. At the same time it recognizes a
danger in doing so, one informed by the lesson of Fleet Factors."' To that end,
the FDIC Guidelines note that even while closely scrutinizing and monitoring
a borrower, a lender should at the same time evaluate whether its actions in
doing so rise to the level of "participation in management" which would vitiate
the secured creditor exemption." 9
F. State Rehabilitation Programs
The remediation costs related to contamination of property by hazardous
and other substances are, at this point in time, a well recognized fact of
commercial life. The Florida Legislature has specifically recognized two of the
most frequent sources of contaminated property, that caused by petroleum
storage tanks and dry cleaning facilities, and has provided public funding
mechanisms to assist in their remediation. These programs may serve to provide
a lender with either additional financial assurances prior to executing a loan
arrangement or funds for reimbursement should it lose the secured creditor
exemption and be held liable for clean-up costs.
Of the two state rehabilitation programs, the older is the Abandoned Tank
Restoration Program ("ATRP") which provides funding for the cleanup of
contamination of abandoned petroleum tanks.'2 The Florida Legislature
recently renewed this program for another two years. Note that there are some
strict qualification requirements that must be met.'2' A borrower's facility may
not qualify based upon past regulatory exceedances or failures.'22 Counsel
Il See Section HI.B.I.c, supra.
119 Indeed, the FDIC Guidelines have been subject to criticism on this very point. See Charles E.
Bethel II, Are FDIC Environmental Risk Guidelines Adequate or Is the FDIC Leading Banks Out of Their
Safe Harbor?, 17 HAMLINE L. REv. 177 (1993); see also Constantine Sidamon-Eristoff and Robert LoBue,
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's New Environmental Guidelines, 22 REAL EST. L J. 319 (1994).
It is for this very reason that environmental counsel should be retained not only to assist in designing an
appropriate environmental risk management program, but to monitor the status of lender liability law and how
legislative and judicial developments affect the risk calculus.
120 Fla. Stat. § 376.3071.
121 Fla. Admin. code r. 17-769.800.
22 See, e.g., Flav-O-Rich, Inc. v. State of Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, 13
FALR 921 (1991) (denial of eligibility for participation in restoration coverage of Florida Petroleum Liability
Insurance and Restoration Program for failure to properly abandon underground storage tanks, failure to
maintain inventory records, failure to timely install a monitoring system and overfill protection and failure to
properly monitor leak detection systems); Weeks Oil Company, Inc. v. State of Florida Department of
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should be engaged to review a borrower's representations about its facility, its
past compliance history and likelihood of receiving reimbursement funds.
These caveats also apply to the most recent state rehabilitation program
which provides for the cleanup of facilities contaminated by dry cleaning
solvents.1 3 Moreover, as this program only became effective July 1, 1994, a
lender's reliance on representations related to future funding from this source
would be ill-advised for another reason. Regulations related to qualifying,
priority and fund disbursement will take some time to promulgate and finalize.
Any legal challenge to these regulations will further delay implementation. In
short, the final parameters will not be established for some time.
While in some circumstances, state reimbursement funds may provide
adequate additional assurances sufficient to extend a loan, these situations must
be subjected to the closest of scrutiny.
G. Proposed Storage Tank Rule
Given all that has transpired with the promulgation and subsequent
vacation of the Final Rule, the EPA is acutely aware of the credit crunch facing
owners and operators of facilities likely to use, store or become contaminated
with hazardous waste."n This factor in conjunction with a recent federal
mandate to upgrade and replace Underground Storage Tank ("UST") systems,
has prompted the EPA to propose a lender liability rule specifically for UST
systems (the "UST Rule"). 5 The UST Rule is simply a clarification of an
existing statutory exemption for secured creditors under Subtitle I of RCRA.26
Under the proposed UST Rule, a lender is eligible for an exemption, both
prior to and after foreclosure, if the lender (i) holds an ownership interest in an
UST or in a property on which the UST is located in order to protect its security
interest; (ii) does not engage in petroleum production, refining and marketing;
Environmental Regulation, 12 FALR 2827 (1990) (denial for participation in Early Detection Incentive
Program under §376.3071(9)(b)3 due to gross negligence in the maintenance of a petroleum storage system);
Flash Foods, Inc. v. State of Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, 89 ER FALR 0080 (1989)
(denial for participation in Early Detection Incentive Program under §376.3071(9)(b)3 due to gross negligence
in failure to meet monitoring and retrofit requirements).
123 H.R. 2817/Ch. 94-355.
124 59 Fed. Reg. 30,448 (June 13, 1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 280.200 et seq.).
I" Id.
126 The exemption provides that the term "owner" in the statute "does not include any person, who,
without participating in the management of an underground storage tank and otherwise not engaged in
petroleum production, refining and marketing, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect the owner's
security interest in the tank." RCRA § 9003(h)(9).
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(iii) does not participate in the management or operation of the UST; and (iv)
does not store petroleum in the UST after foreclosure. 27
Without going into detail, the rule discusses and defines the terms
"participating in management," "indicia of ownership" and "primarily to
protect a security interest" and lists types of activities that can be undertaken
without losing the exemption. Significantly, the proposed UST Rule also rejects
the "mere capacity" test."2 In short, it generally mirrors the now vacated Final
Rule on lender liability. 29 Should it survive the inevitable legal challenge, it
should provide sufficient assurances to lenders financing the purchase,
renovation or general upgrading of gas stations and other similar petroleum
facilities.
VH. SUPERFUND REFORM
No doubt any permanent and certainly the most meaningful relief will come
from Congress. The high level of uncertainty and the universally unacceptable
compliance and program costs"O associated with Superfund has famously
aroused resentment and opposition from all quarters - lenders, manufacturers,
municipalities, business and professional associations and insurers. 3' While for
many years, these groups concentrated their energies on scuttling CERCLA
altogether,1 32 and past Congressional efforts to deal with this issue have
127 See 59 Fed Reg. 30,465-30,466.
12s See 59 Fed Reg. 30,463-30,465.
129 In a footnote contained in the preamble to the UST Rule, the EPA acknowledges the Kelley case,
but maintains that the decision does not affect the current proposed regulations. According to the EPA, its
mulemaking authority under RCRA is broader than that under CERCLA and is sufficiently explicit. 59 Fed.
Reg. 30,451 n.3.
130 It is estimated that annual environmental compliance will exceed $200 billion by the end of this
decade. Robert G. Harvey and Michael H. Levin, What You Can Do If You Don't Have Cash - Financing
Environmental Compliance, 24 ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 46, at 1984 (March 18, 1994); see also Claudia
MacLachlan, Marianne Lavelle and Marcia Coyle, EPA Chief Decries Legal Bills of Superfund (Carol
Browner), NAT'L L.J., May 24, 1993, at 5.
131 See Business Leaders Call For Program Overhaul, Concede That Reforms Likely to Increase
Costs, 24 ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 23, at 1072 (Oct. 8, 1993); House Chair Shelves Efforts to Overhaul Law
After Remedy Selection Negotiations Collapse, 24 ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 50, at 2091 (May 6, 1994). For
a discussion of the problems facing selected interest groups and suggested legislative solutions, see Earl K.
Madsen, Dennis L Arfmann, and John Galbavy, Supeifund Reauthorization: An Opportunity to Rectify Major
Problems, 24 ENv'T REP. (BNA) No. 22, at 1020 (Oct. 1, 1993).
132 See U.S. v. A & N Cleaners and Launderers, Inc., 854 F.Supp. 229, 239 (S.D.N.Y.) (" ...
CERCLA is now viewed nearly universally as a failure"); Robert W. McGee, Superfulnd: It's Time for Repeal
After a Decade of Failure, 12 UCLA J. OF ENVTL L. & POL'Y 165 (1993); Estelle Fishbein, Superflop; the
Failure of Superfund, and the Flawed Plan to Fix It, WASH. POST, April 22, 1994 at A25; Ralph W. Siskind,
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stalled,'33 more recently a consensus has emerged and meaningful reform
appears imminent.' 3
The Superfund Reform Act of 1994, 3' has emerged as the primary vehicle
for amending CERCLA. While the House version contains detailed provisions
related to lenders, real relief for the industry will come not only through a
congressional clarification of the secured creditor exemption - it will involve
substantive reform to CERCLA itself. This too looks achievable as the reform
package proposed by Congress contains various components which will appeal
to most potential PRPs, from deep pocket defendants such as lenders,
municipalities and insurers to individuals and small businesses that comprise
the majority of small quantity generators.
A. Direct Relieffor Lenders
The House version exhumes the lender liability rule from its judicial
grave. 36 In amending CERCLA § 115, it directly references the Federal
Register citation to the Final Rule, deeming it to have been validly issued under
CERCLA and precluding judicial review of same. A comparable version
proposed in the Senate'37 takes a somewhat different approach. It does limit the
The Not So Superfund: Replacing the Law's Liability Scheme in the Law Might Make It Work Better, 16
PENN. LJ., May 10, 1993, at 5.
13 For an excellent and comprehensive survey of past legislative Superfund reform proposals as well
as a review of the current House and Senate proposals, see Uncertain Times for Lenders at 103270-30; see
also James E. Satterfield, A Tale of Sound and Fury: The Environmental Record of the 102d Congress, 23
ENvTL. L REP. 10015 (Jan. 1993). For additional thorough analysis of the Superfund Reform Act, see Richard
E. Bartelt and David E. Polter, Summary of the Proposed Superfund Reform Act of 1994, 25 ENV'T REP.
(BNA) No. 13, at 608 (July 29, 1994); Steven M. Javetz, The Superfund Reform Act of 1991: Success or
Failure is Within EPA's Sole Discretion, 24 ENVnL.. L. REP. 10161 (April 1994).
134 See Reauthorization Process Back on Track after EPA's Proposed Changes Win Support, 25
ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 1, at 4 (May 6, 1994); House Subcommittee Approves Reform Bill; State Role,
Voluntary Cleanup Titles Added, 25 ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 2, at 43 (May 13, 1994); Groups Suggests
Dozens ofSuperfind Amendments to House Panel, 15 INSIDE EPA, No. 29, July 22, 1994, at 3; Reform Bill
Continues Advance in House; Move against Retroactive Liability Thwarted, 25 ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 13,
at 579 (July 29, 1994); but see In the Congress, 24 ENVIL. L. REP. (News and Analysis) 10488 (August 1994)
("The race to reauthorization is close, and the pressure on legislators is enormous. Powerful interests with
vastly different concerns contend that Congress must reauthorize these statutes their way. Compromises are
difficult to forge and difficult to preserve. Participants threaten to 'kill' proposals or 'hold them hostage.' For
the cynics, it is business as usual in our nation's capital.").
13 Superfund Reform Act of 1994, H.R. 3800, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); Superfund Reform Act
of 1994, S. 1834, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
13 H.R. 3800, § 407.
137 S. 1834, §§ 44, 131.
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liability of those lenders who either reacquire a facility through foreclosure or
who would otherwise be liable as owners and operators. Liability would be
limited to the actual benefit (net gain in property) conferred on the lender by a
remediation unless the lender caused or contributed to a release. However,
rather than incorporating the EPA's rule, the Senate bill articulates those
specific actions that a lender could take and still avoid liability. Federal banking
and lending activities are also shielded from certain CERCLA liabilities.
B. Additional Reforms - Indirect Relieffor Lenders
1. Rollback of Joint and Several Liability/Adoption of Equitable
Allocation Scheme
There are other likely reforms which will serve to reduce a lender's total
exposure should it be held liable. A detailed allocation system is proposed to
ameliorate some of the perceived unfairness that results from the joint and
several liability scheme. Under this proposed scheme, the PRPs for a Superfund
site would select an EPA-approved allocator. The allocator would be
empowered to gather information, conduct investigations and compel
compliance with information gathering efforts. He or she would then make a
non-binding apportionment recommendation based upon a list of factors
including: the amount of hazardous substances contributed by each allocation
party; the degree of toxicity of hazardous substances contributed by each
allocation party; the degree of involvement of each allocation party in the
generation, transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous
substances; degree of care exercised by each allocation party with respect to the
hazardous substance; and the cooperation of each allocation party in
contributing to the response action and in providing complete and timely
information during the allocation process.
2. Legislative "Due Diligence" Definition and Establishment of
Consultant Standards
Another major reform that is a long time in coming, but welcome
nonetheless, is related to the due diligence required of those parties that acquire
title to real property upon which contamination is later discovered. While there
has been considerable speculation regarding what is the sufficient "all
appropriate inquiry" that must take place prior to purchase to establish the
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"innocent landowner" defense under sections 107(b)(3) and 101(35) of
CERCLA and whether any given phase I assessment will qualify, EPA has
heretofore never defined acceptable criteria and content. In an effort to resolve
this uncertainty, the House version would authorize the EPA to establish
standards or adopt standards developed by others. The House bill also directs
the EPA to establish a model state program for organizations that train and
certify individuals to perform phase I assessments.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Lenders and others attempting to keep track of environmental regulations
and the cases interpreting them have every right to feel dizzy. There is a non-
stop swirl of activity - legislative, administrative and judicial - and liabilities
expand and contract gyre-like. While it seems that a legislative fix now
slouches towards Congress to be bom, this apparition may ultimately prove
illusory. Taken as whole, the climate for lenders doing business in the Eleventh
Circuit is extremely precarious. Moreover, as the Eleventh Circuit has not
readdressed the issue of secured creditor liability since Fleet Factors, it would
be ill-advised at best for any lender to bank on escaping liability based on the
developing and somewhat more expansive caselaw in other jurisdictions. For
lenders holding collateral in Dade County, the risks are even more acute, and
any relief from the Eleventh Circuit is not likely to alter this fact. The liability
provisions of Chapter 24 of the Dade County Code were drafted with precision
and care, and it will be extremely difficult for any secured creditor to
successfully defend against a cost recovery suit filed by Dade County.
What can remain constant in this storm of uncertainty and change is the
precaution a lender takes in entering into a loan relationship and the diligence
it maintains thereafter. Adequate investigation of the borrower and proffered
collateral prior to extending funds, close continued scrutiny thereafter,
knowledge regarding the status of the law and the leeway it currently affords
lenders in monitoring and directing a borrower's operations, and a legally and
factually informed and carefully crafted foreclosure contingency plan will
provide adequate although not absolute protection against environmental risk.
